Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian
Philosophers
Volume 16

Issue 4

Article 6

10-1-1999

David O'Connor, GOD AND INSCRUTABLE EVIL: IN DEFENSE OF
THEISM AND ATHEISM
Michael Bergmann

Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy

Recommended Citation
Bergmann, Michael (1999) "David O'Connor, GOD AND INSCRUTABLE EVIL: IN DEFENSE OF THEISM AND
ATHEISM," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 16 : Iss. 4 , Article
6.
DOI: 10.5840/faithphil199916445
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol16/iss4/6

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and
creative exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange.

BOOK REVIEWS

God and Inscrutable Evil: In Defense of Theism and Atheism by David
O'Connor. Rowman and Littlefield, 1997. Pp. xiii and 273. $63.00
(Cloth); 23.95 (Paper).
MICHAEL BERGMANN, Purdue University
In this book David O'Connor carefully and fairly argues that both atheists and theists should recognize that each other's views on Cod's existence can be justified. His focus is inscrutable evil (evil for which we can
discern no justification). He argues that the atheist's awareness of the
existence of such evil lends support to her atheism and contributes to the
justification of that view. Nevertheless, he thinks this same awareness
on the part of the theist needn't make her theism irrational.
In explaining how this can be so, O'Connor identifies two frameworks within which to examine the argument for atheism from the existence of inscrutable evil. The first is the framework of what he calls 'the
standard model'. According to this first framework, we are able "to
compare, in terms of inscrutable evit the condition of the actual world to
how the world would be if Cod did not exist" and on the basis of such a
comparison, draw a justified conclusion "as to which of the two sides
has the stronger evidence and so the better of the argument about theism and inscrutable evil" (229). The second is the framework of what he
calls 'skeptical theism'. According to it our failure to discern any Godjustifying reason for an evil does not provide evidence for thinking there
is no God-justifying reason for that evil (185). Now, as I understand
him, O'Connor suggests (230-31) that the reason both the atheist and
theist can be justified in their beliefs and yet recognize that the other is
also justified is this. Given the standard model one is justified in accepting atheism, while given the skeptical theist's framework one is justified
in accepting theism, or at least inscrutable evil poses no threat to theistic
belief that is otherwise justified. Unfortunately, there are no decisive considerations that are telling for both atheists and theists in support of
either the standard model or the skeptical theist's framework.
Recognition of these two points should, he thinks, lead to the detente he
recommends.
The book is divided into two parts. In the first part (chapters 2-8), he
stays within the standard model. In that context, he proposes what he
calls 'a reformed logical argument from evil'. His main purpose in presenting this argument is to show that the best currently available
responses (those by Hasker, Plantinga, Schlesinger, Swinburne and van
Inwagen) to arguments like his fail to successfully defend theism against
his reformed logical argument. He then uses this failure as a premise in
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what he calls Ian indirect empirical argument from evil'. That indirect
argument goes like this: since theism is a theory that must be defended
against an argument such as his reformed argument if it is to be justifiably believed and since the best available defenses fail, we have, in the
context of the standard model, "good reason, if we are either agnostics
or theists to begin with, to move toward atheism" (178).
Let's take a closer look at his reformed logical argument from evil.
O'Connor divides evils into the following three kinds: moral evils, natural evils resulting from natural processes alone (NERNP) and natural
evils not resulting from natural processes alone (NE-RNP). NE-RNP
are evils to which free moral agents have contributed in nonmoral ways
(e.g., accidentally knocking a cat off a high balcony and thereby terrifying and killing it). His reformed logical argument (10-12) can be outlined as follows:

1. There is seeming NERNP (above some level n).l
2. Seeming NERNP (above level n) is gratuitous. 2
3. Gratuitous evil is inconsistent with orthodox theism (OT).
4. Therefore, OT is false. 3
O'Connor begins his defense of this argument by considering (in chapter
3) Hasker's and van lnwagen's objections to premise 3. His treatment of
Hasker is excellent. But since Hasker tries to explain why there is a
God-justifying reason for permitting gratuitous evil (i.e., evil for the permission of which there is no justifying reason) it isn't too surprising that
O'Connor is able to identify errors in Hasker's argument. Van Inwagen
does not attempt to identify a God-justifying reason for the existence of
gratuitous evil. His point is that chance evil is compatible with the existence of God (chance evil is evil for which there is no reason at all and,
hence, no God-justifying reason). But O'Connor takes van Inwagen to
be conceding that although gratuitous evil and God are compatible, not
just any amount of gratuitous evil is compatible with the existence of
God. So O'Connor sidesteps van Inwagen's objection to premise 3 by
reformulating it (and premise 2) to say:
2*. Seeming NERNP (above level n) is too much gratuitous or point-

less evil.

3*. Too much gratuitous or pointless evil is inconsistent with OT.
With these revisions in place, O'Connor sets out (in chapter 4) to
defend premise 2*. He first explains what he means by OT. OT is a theistic worldview according to which (among other things) God allows
certain amounts of evil so that he can obtain the following good:
G: having free creatures that can develop morally and spiritually
into beings who can freely love and serve God (78).
Then O'Connor appeals to a point conceded by those who grant the
plausibility of Plantinga's free will defense (86-88). The point is that
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there is a possible world in which God is able to obtain G without permitting any genuine NERNP (i.e., a world in which all seeming NERNP
is caused by Satan and his cohorts). This possibility doesn't show that
God could have obtained G without permitting any seeming NERNP.
But once you grant it, it is a short step to granting that it is possible for
God to have obtained G without creating Satan (or any other free creature capable of being responsible for all seeming NERNP). This is exactly
the possibility O'Connor draws to our attention later in the book when
discussing Plantinga's defense (124-26). Thus, O'Connor relies on the
above considerations to establish
P: God could have obtained G without permitting any seeming
NERNP.
And from this he infers that
Q: All seeming NERNP is gratuitous.

For van Inwagen reasons, he allows that a certain amount of seeming
NERNP may be consistent with OT. But seeming NERNP above some
level n is too much gratuitous evil. This conclusion is his premise 2*.
What should we make of O'Connor's reformed logical argument?
O'Connor claims to show that the best available defenses (Plantinga's,
Schlesinger'S and Swinburne's) fail when applied to this argument. But
even before considering those defenses and O'Connor's reply to them, I
think we can see that his reformed logical argument is seriously flawed.
Let's grant him premises 1 and 3*. This still leaves premise 2*. And,
unfortunately, it is pretty clear that O'Connor's defense of premise 2*
doesn't work. For notice that in defending premise 2*, O'Connor made
the inference from P to Q. From the fact that seeming NERNP is not
necessary for achieving G, he concluded that such evil is gratuitous. But
what if seeming NERNP is necessary for some other reason? What if the
divine plan includes the securing of outweighing goods other than G,
goods that can be secured only by allowing seeming NERNP above level
n? In saying that the divine plan includes the securing of G, OT is not
committed to saying that it includes the securing of no other goods.
O'Connor takes himself to have identified a kind of evil that is incompatible with OT. But what he's shown (at best) is that seeming NERNP
above level n is inconsistent with a version of OT that insists that the
only reason God would allows such evil is to obtain G. And that is not a
very widely held version of OT (I know of no one who endorses it).
In the remainder of part one (chapters 5-7) O'Connor considers how
the defenses he mentions fare when applied to the reformed logical
argument. I don't have much to say about his discussion of the
Swinburne and Schlesinger defenses. What he says there seems eminently sensible. But his discussion of Plantinga in chapter 6 is the weakest part of the book. The reader's suspicions that there is trouble ahead
are roused upon reading O'Connor's account of the property Plantinga
calls 'transworld depravity'. Like many others, O'Connor seems to seri-
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ously misunderstand what that property is.4 When he formulates it in
his own words (122) he shows no sensitivity to the fact that counterfactuals are involved. And he says that Plantinga's claim is that it is possible that transworld depravity is an essential property of every creaturely
essence with morally significant freedom. But Plantinga explicitly
insists that he is claiming only that it is possible that it is an accidental
property of all such essences. s Furthermore, O'Connor takes Plantinga
to be denyillg Mackie's claim that there is a possible world in which all
free creatures always freely do what is right. But, again, Plantinga
explicitly insists that he is granting that possibility." So O'Connor
appears to have failed to appreciate the intricacies of Plantinga's free
will defense. Fortunately, the bulk of his discussion of Plantinga does
not depend on a correct understanding of the details of that defense.
However, the troubles in chapter 6 do not end there. It is in this chapter that O'Connor argues that there is a world (actualizable by God) that
has no seeming NERNP and in which God secures the good G. The
world in question is one in which God obtains G without permitting the
existence of Satan or any other being capable of causing all seeming
NERNP (125-26). This shows, says O'Connor, that a Plantinga-style
defense does not succeed in defending the compatibility of seeming
NERNP and OT. But a slight modification of Plantinga's free will
defense (which, as O'Connor acknowledges, must be modified if it is to
even apply to the reformed logical argument) will do the trick. Suppose
that the outweighing good that God wants is not merely G but:
G*: having a sufficient variety of kinds of free creatures that can
develop morally and spiritually into beings who can freely love
and serve God.
And suppose that each creaturely essence with morally significant freedom is (contingently) transworld depraved.' Then, assuming that having angelic beings of Satan's kind (or other beings capable of causing
seeming NERNP) is entailed by G*, we can say that O'Connor's
reformed argument succumbs to a Plantinga-like defense. For, given the
above suppositions, in order to obtain G* God had to make a transworld
depraved being capable of being morally responsible for seeming
NERNP. O'Connor has done nothing to show that this isn't so - that
God could secure G* without allowing for seeming NERNP. And it is
no part of OT to deny that G* is one of the goods God wanted to obtain.
But there is no need for the theist to identify a good like G* in order to
resist O'Connor's arguments. It is enough for the defender of OT to
point out, as I did earlier, that O'Connor has done nothing to show that
every outweighing good that God thinks is worth securing can be
secured in a world in which he permits no seeming NERNP. But this is
what O'Connor would have to do if he is interested in attacking the
most plausible versions of OT (since they don't claim that G is the only
good that God seeks to obtain by permitting evil). Thus, it looks like the
two main arguments of part one - the reformed logical argument and
the indirect empirical argument which relied on its success - fail. And
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this isn't a problem that can easily be avoided. As far as I can tell, it can
be avoided only by focusing on versions of OT that claim to give an
exhaustive list of the outweighing goods that provide God with reasons
for allowing evil (O'Connor himself seems to focus on a version of OT
whose purportedly exhaustive list contains only G). But the problem is
that almost no one endorses such versions of OT.8
Let's turn now to part two of the book (chapters 9-11). Here he considers the problem of evil within the skeptical theist's framework.
According to the skeptical theist, our failure to discern a God-justifying
reason for the evil we observe (e.g. seeming NERNP) provides no compelling reason for thinking there is no God-justifying reason for such evil.
As I understand the thread of O'Connor's argument in these chapters,
he first makes an important concession to the skeptical theist. In making
this concession, he is conceding that theism can be rational even for
well-informed believers. Then he identifies some considerations that he
thinks make it reasonable for the atheist to reject the skeptical theist's
framework and to stick with the framework of the standard model
instead. Given that these considerations can be rationally compelling for
the atheist without being rationally compelling for the theist, he arrives
at his conclusion that both theism and atheism can be justified. I will
argue that the considerations that, according to O'Connor, support a
rejection of the skeptical theist's framework do not in fact support such a
rejection. Given the concession O'Connor makes to the skeptical theist it
appears that atheists and theists alike have every reason to endorse the
main ingredients of the skeptical theist's framework (which doesn't
include theism itself).
What is the concession that O'Connor makes to the skeptical theist?
He recognizes our limitations when it comes to discerning the sorts of
reasons God might have for doing what he does. Thus, he concedes
(208) that
R: We have no good reason to expect that if OT were true we
would be able to discern God-justifying reasons for the evils that
are permitted. Y
I think this concession is extremely plausible. I also think it provides
decisive support for the skeptical theist's framework (though not for theism itself).
Let's consider the various considerations that O'Connor says count
against the skeptical theist's framework. First, there is the problem of
divine silence. It is one thing, says O'Connor (208-9), to acknowledge
that it is not reasonable to expect to be able to discern God's reasons for
allowing the evil we see. But, given that God is like a loving parent, it is
reasonable, assuming OT, to expect that God will somehow communicate to us (i) that despite the fact that we can't discern his reasons for
allowing the evils we see, there are reasons and (ii) that he still loves and
cares for us.
The thing to recognize here is that the problematic consequences of
divine silence in the face of inscrutable evil are just further instances of
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inscrutable evil. It is certainly possible that God has a reason not only
for allowing some inscrutable evil but also for refraining from giving us
the assurances of his love that O'Connor thinks we should reasonably
expect. The question we need to ask ourselves is this: If there were Godjustifying reasons for divine silence in the face of inscrutable evils, is it
reasonable to expect that we would be able to discern what those reasons are? It seems to me that once again we should recognize that we
have no good reason at all for expecting such discernment on our part.
Thus, the sensible theistic response to the problem of divine silence is
simply to point out that it is just another example of inscrutable evil and
then to appeal to R (the plausibility of which O'Connor has already conceded).
O'Connor goes on to mention (219-22) two hidden costs of the skeptical theist's position. One is that the skeptical theist will need to be evenhanded in her skepticism. O'Connor's prediction is that this even-handedness will result in "a serious curtailment of traditionally significant
intellectual dimensions of theism" (220). After all, some access to divine
intentions is required in order to pursue parts of natural theology, moral
theology and perhaps even philosophical psychology and anthropology.
The main thrust of this point can and should be conceded to O'Connor
with qualification. For the fact that we can't discern God-justifying reasons if he hasH' t revealed them to us doesn't in the least require a skepticism about our ability to discern what God has revealed to us. And
while one should be even-handed in one's skepticism, it isn't obvious in
advance exactly what things even-handedness will require one to be
skeptical about in the other arenas O'Connor mentions. So although
there may well be limitations to these traditional intellectual pursuits by
theists, it isn't at all clear that even-handed skepticism will result in a
"serious curtailment" of them.
The other cost he mentions is that skeptical theism prevents us from
calling theism an empirical theory (221). I take the point here to be that
insofar as one rejects the standard model, one is rejecting theistic evidentialism. But there is a strong and growing tradition in contemporary
philosophy of religion that aligns itself with what has come to be called
'Reformed Epistemology'. And one of the main theses of this tradition is
that we should reject evidentialism (a rejection which, contrary to popular belief, doesn't require opposition to the goal of finding good theistic
arguments). So, for many theists, this supposed cost isn't a cost at all.
And in any case, it's hard to see how it is sensible, in response to this
supposed cost, to reject R. R seems eminently plausible and if it leads us
away from evidentialism, so much the worse for evidentialism.
The final consideration O'Connor mentions as one that makes it rational for the atheist to reject the skeptical theist's framework is that the
standard model has a far better "fit with our initial (strong) intuition
that those facts of evil for which we can discern no God-justifying reason
count heavily against OT" (231). But why can't the atheist, in light of the
extreme plausibility of R, simply recognize that although this intuition is
strong it is mistaken? After all, the strength of this intuition seems to
depend almost entirely on the assumption that if there were God-justify-
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ing reasons for the evils we observe, we would be able to discern what
those reasons are. And that assumption, as tempting as it is for both theists and atheists alike, is mistaken insofar as it conflicts with R.
In sum, although I applaud O'Connor's forthrightness in recognizing
the plausibility of R for both the theist and the atheist alike as well as his
efforts at establishing a detente between theists and atheists writing in
the philosophy of religion, I don't think he identifies an adequate reason
for the atheist to reject R. And by failing to do that, he fails to achieve
one of the goals he sets for himself in part two of the book (that of showing that the atheist can rationally reject the skeptical theist's framework).
God and Inscrutable Evil is a very important contribution to the current
discussion of the problem of evil. Despite the fact that I find O'Connor's
defense (in part two) of the atheist's rejection of the skeptical theist's
framework unconvincing and that I think the two main arguments in
part one are fatally flawed, r highly recommend the book. It is eminently fair, quite comprehensive and, for the most part, very insightful in its
arguments and criticisms.lO

NOTES
1.
Seeming NERNP mayor may not be genuine NERNP.
2.
Gratuitous evil is evil the permission of which isn't necessary for
achieving some greater good or preventing some worse evil.
3.
When O'Connor presents his argument, he speaks only of NERNP,
not seeming NERNP. But later (e.g. 133), he refers to seeming natural evil
that is caused with evil intent by free moral agents like Satan as NERNP. So
we are forced to either (i) redefine NERNP (as "evil that is either natural evil
resulting from natural processes alone or seeming natural evil that is in fact
moral evil intentionally caused by nonhuman free moral agents") or (ii) formulate the argument in terms of seeming NERNP. I've chosen the latter
option since evil intentionally caused by a creature like Satan seems more
appropriately referred to as moral evil than as natural evil of a certain kind.
4.
See my "Might-Counterfactuals, Transworld Untrustworthiness
and Plantinga's Free Will Defense", Faith and Philosophy 16 (1999): 336-51,
section 4 where I mention other examples of this sort of confusion.
5.
See The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), p. 188.
6.
See his "Self-Profile", Alvin Plantinga, James Tomberlin and Peter
van Inwagen, eds. (Dordrecht: D. Reidel: 1985), p. 47.
7.
See The Nature of Necessity p. 188 for Plantinga's definition of
transworld depravity.
8.
Perhaps O'Connor thinks that, according to the standard model, OT
is committed to identifying some exhaustive list of the goods that provide
God with reasons for permitting evil (perhaps even a list containing only G).
But if that's what the standard model entails, then it is relevant only to versions of OT that hardly anyone endorses - the standard model just isn't
applicable to discussions of any widely held version of OT. This sort of consideration raises doubts about how standard the standard model is.
9.
There are (as William Rowe reminds me) at least two possible readings of R. On the first reading, 'discern' means discern on our own; on the
second it means discern on 01lr own or with the aid of divine intervention. In
what follows, I proceed on the assumption that O'Connor accepts R on both
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readings. 1, like O'Connor (as I understand him), think R is extremely plausible on both readings. However, there are those who find R plausible on
the first reading but not on the second. I don't have the space here to defend
the plausibility of R on the second reading. Let me just say that to reject R
on that second reading, it seems one would need a reason to think there is
no good that (a) includes the permission of all inscrutable evil but doesn't
include divine intervention of the kind that would make it possible for us to
discern reasons for the permission of such evils and (b) is greater than any
other obtainable good that doesn't include such things or other things as
bad. But we don't have a reason to think there is no good like this. Our
inability to identify such a good certainly doesn't provide us with such a
reason.
10. My thanks to Dan Howard-Snyder, Bill Rowe and Linda Zagzebski
for their comments on earlier drafts.

Religion and Faction in Hume's Moral Philosophy by Jennifer A. Herdt.
Cambridge University Press, 1997. Pp. xiv and 300. Cloth $59.95
ELIZABETH RADCLIFFE, Santa Clara University
Jennifer Herdt's fascinating book is a study of the concept of sympathy
in Hume's moral philosophy. So why this title? What makes Herdt's
discussion unique is that she examines this central notion in Hume's
moral theory in the context of religion and its divisive effect on seventeenth- and eighteenth-century society. Her thesis is that when Hume's
moral theory is studied within the tradition of natural law from which it
is descended, it becomes evident that Hume replaces divine revelation
in previous moral frameworks with the workings of natural sympathy.
Generally, the argumentation of this book is historical; that is, Herdt
defends various claims concerning the philosophical development of
Hume's moral philosophy by appealing to the ideas and current events
to which he is reacting. Herdt's interpretation appeals to a breadth of
Hume's writings, including the critical essays and The History of England.
Consequently, readers should not come here looking for an analytic
study of the arguments in Hume's ethics; rather, they should expect an
interpretation in a broad, historically-informed setting. At the same
time, Herdt's discussion leads to some interesting claims about the content of Hume's moral theory that I wil1later address here.
The purpose of Herdt's plan is clear: She wants to reject the approach
to Hume that has mainly seen him as concerned with epistemology, and
substitute for it an interpretation that sees Hume as concerned in his
work with achieving a social outcome-namely, peace and prosperity.
Then, she claims, Hume's political essays and the History form a unified
corpus with his other very famous works (Preface, xiii). Herdt explains
that her book, to which it is well worth devoting some time, is designed
to defend eight claims.
(1) Hume's project is best understood in the context of natural law,
but it is more radical than the other natural law theorists. They purport

